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Abstract
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public
good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets
large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis
is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern
information technologies.
1 Motivation
Limit theorems for the provision of goods under asymmetric information
about individual valuations with many agents yield strongly opposing results
depending on whether the good to be provided is private or public. In the
former case the impossibility result of ex-post e¢ cient provision given the
presence of both private information and voluntary participation follows from
the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) Theorem.
In the case of a public good, i.e. a good that is non-rival in consumption,
the limit result can be fundamentally di¤erent. Intuitively, with only few
0This paper is a revised version of Chapter 2 of my PhD dissertation at Universität
Mannheim. I am grateful to my supervisor Martin Hellwig, the editors and referees,
and paricipants at PET Hanoi, the MPI for Research on Collective Goods Bonn, ESEM
Vienna, Tilburg, Munich, and CORE Louvain-la-Neuve.
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agents, misrepresentations of valuations leading to lower contributions for
public good provision are deterred by the fact that the chances that to good
will be supplied at all would decrease signicantly. With many agents, each
agent will have a lower probability of being pivotal. On the other hand a
misrepresentation of valuations may still lead to lower contributions. Hence
the ine¢ ciency is expected to be larger in the limit. Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) give an example for such an ine¢ ciency result where the probability
of provision converges to zero as the number of agents grows out of bounds.
Their negative limit result hinges on the assumption that the total cost of the
public good is linear in the number of agents which prevents this magnitude
from having any impact on the necessary level of per-capita contributions.
This nding is further generalized in Lehrer and Neeman (2000).
More recently Hellwig (2003), in a more general analysis that allows for
variable public good quantities, disentangles the two e¤ects and shows that
assuming independence of the cost function from the number of agents is
su¢ cient for the negative limit result to be reversed. For a public good
that is excludable, Norman (2004) shows that even with a linear total cost,
a mechanism exits that charges a simple xed fee from each non-excluded
agent and allows for provision in the limit. The magnitude of the implied
waste from exclusion relative to rst best will be strictly reduced if there is
more than one public good that can be bundled as shown in Fang & Norman
(2008).
The discussion which cost assumption is more adequate when looking
at public good provision in replica economies goes back to Roberts(1976)
analysis who, using national defense as a motivation, also opts against the
constant cost specication. This paper avoids the di¢ culty of an explicit
choice between these regimes as the corresponding cost function for the pro-
vision of the public good will be determined endogenously. We depart from
existing approaches by specifying a benchmark innovation technology that
allows for direct provision of the public good by the agents. The provision
thus does not lie in the hand of some external entity but can be undertaken
by each agent individually. Agentsdichotomous nature as beneciaries and
as direct providers of the public good allows us to set up a mechanism that
consists of separate contracts.
Motivation for this particular technology can be found when looking at
information as a commodity. Inventions, academic research, and the produc-
2
tion of knowledge in general share the feature of having a modular structure
consisting of information. Progress is made at the individual level and for
the potential benet of the community at large. Processes that use informa-
tion as an input as well as an output also benet the individual providing it
as it allows for further investigation. Similarly, specic innovation processes
such as those made possible by modern information technology that allow
for a segmentation of large and complex tasks (the creation of a multi-lingual
online encyclopedia such as Wikipedia, the creation of complex network and
community sites such as Myspace or Facebook, or the development of open
source software) to a multitude of developers and researchers can be captured
by it.
The core of all these processes consist of information as the essential
and indivisible commodity that is non-rival in consumption and often non-
excludable and if it is, e.g. if patenting is possible or spillovers are not
inevitable, this may not be socially desirable. Thus treating information as
public goods for the purpose of our analysis seems to be a very natural choice.
Following a standard Bayesian mechanism design approach we seek an
incentive compatible, individual rational, and feasible mechanism allowing
for side payments to generate the provision of the public good. We derive
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of such a mechanism.
We show that the conditions for existence of the mechanism will be relaxed
as the number of agents gets large. Most importantly, given our technology
and a large number of agents we can approximate the rst best outcome
arbitrarily closely.
The underlying intuition for our main result is as follows: as argued above
with many agents, each agent will have a lower probability of being pivotal
increasing the incentives to misrepresent valuations. On the other hand the
modular structure of independent development and research e¤orts given the
direct provision technology imply that with many agents provision is almost
certain at a cost that is increasing but bounded above. Hence the benet
of a misrepresentation on required individual contributions is decreasing but
bounded below by zero. It will then be shown that the convergence behaviour
of the two incentives is such that for any cost level there always exists a large
enough number of agents such that the latter e¤ect dominates.
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2 The setup
There are n agents with private valuation parameter (type) i 2 ; i =
1; 2:::n;   [; ] which are realizations of independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables ~i. The random variables ~i are drawn
from identical distributions that have a continuous and strictly positive den-
sity f(i), and a cumulative distribution function F (i).
The provision of the public good is an all or nothing decision, i.e. the
level of the public good provision is xed and will take place with some
probability r() : n ! [0; 1] where the total vector of types is denoted by
 2 [; ]n: Employing the revelation principle we can restrict ourselves to
incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
A mechanism (allocation) is a triple of functions hr();p(); z()i where
p() is the vector of total e¤ort or contributions to the public good with
generic elements (pi()) : n ! [0; 1] and z() is a vector of net side pay-
ments with generic elements (zi()) : n ! R:
Agents net utilities will then consist of the real allocations r() and p()
and the allocation of net side payments z(): Ex-post utilities are denoted
as
ui = ir()  pi()  zi() (1)
As the agent is a user as well as a direct provider of the public good the
utility function can be decomposed into two parts as
ui = ir()  zUi()| {z }
user
 pi() + zPi()| {z }
provider
(2)
respectively, so that net side payments are dened as
zi()  zUi() zPi() (3)
The direct provision technology implies that each agent i can provide the
good with some probability (e¤ort) pi() directly. The total probability of
the good being provided independently with n agents is thus
r() = 1  ni=1(1  pi()) (4)
An allocation is feasible if side payments satisfy
nX
i=1
zi() 
nX
i=1
(zUi() zPi())  0 8  (5)
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A rst best allocation is given as a feasible allocation hr();p(); z()i for
which no other feasible allocation achieves a higher aggregate expected sur-
plus1
nX
i=1
Z
:::
Z
[(r()i   pi())] f(1)f(2):::f(n)dn:::d2d1 = (6)
nX
i=1
Z
[(r()i   pi())] dF n():
The mechanism is divided into two contracts corresponding to the agents
functions. A rst contract is written for the agents as providers and a second
contract for the agents as users. Both contracts are signed at the interim
stage, i.e. when agents know their valuation and are thus subject to the
option of all agents with any valuations to not sign the contract.
2.1 The Provider contract
In this contract, agents are given payments zPi(i; i) in exchange for the
enforceable promise to develop and provide the public good with some prob-
ability pi(i; i): Interim individual rationality which guarantees the volun-
tary acceptance of the contract for any given type requires that
UPi(i) =
Z
( p(i; i) + zPi(i; i))dF n 1( i)  0 8 i (7)
where the outside options have been normalized to zero. This condition can
be guaranteed to hold if we make the implementation assumption of ex-post
individual rationality by equality between
p1() = ::: = pn() = p() =zPi() 8  (8)
hence no agent will ever regret to have taken part in the provision process,
independently of the provision outcome. This implementation assumption
trivially implies that ex-ante individual rationality also holds. Within the
1The second line follows from the assumed independence of the random variables ~i so
that the prior distribution is simply given by the product distribution Fn: Whenever we
leave out the limits of the integrals we integrate over the full support of :
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context of or motivational examples this translates into some fundamental
and equitable compensation mechanism (i.e. some base salary) that keeps
the developer or researcher just indi¤erent to expanding the e¤ort and en-
sure a minimum probability with which the next module will be provided.
Clearly the implied duplication of e¤ort implies a very conservative and thus
robust starting point when investigating the total welfare consequences of
the direct provision technology below. We also assume that e¤ort levels p()
are observable which allows us to set aside potential moral hazard problems
that may occur with development e¤orts that are chosen privately.2
The implementation assumption allows us to write the total provision
probability (4) as
r() = 1  (1  p())n 8  (9)
2.2 The User contract
This contract is intended to generate the side payments zUi(i; i) neces-
sary to nance the expenses incurred by the provider contract and thus to
satisfy the overall feasibility constraint. The form of this contract is more
involved as we have to guarantee that no agent has an incentive to misrepre-
sent valuations that are unobservable to all others. With alternative analyses
of direct mechanisms it shares the feature that it may have to be retrans-
lated into more practical mechanisms that are feasible when looking at the
public good nature of information absent any additional private contractual
framework set up to limit dissipation. Again we guarantee that each agent
will participate voluntarily after own valuations are become known. Interim
incentive compatibility (IIC) then guarantees that no agent has an incentive
to misrepresent valuations, i.e.Z
(r(i; i)i   zUi(i; i))dF n 1( i)  (10)Z
(r(^i; i)i   zUi(^i; i))dF n 1( i) 8 i; ^i 2 ; 8 i
2For an investigation of the optimal design of knowledge sharing in teams (with each
member being important for the aggregate knowledge level) with adverse selection resulting
from the public good characteristics of information and the additional complications of
moral hazard from hidden research e¤orts in a nite economy setting see dAspremont,
Bhattacharya, & Gérard-Varet, 1998.
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Interim individual rationality (IIR) requiresZ
(r(i; i)i   zUi(i; i))dF n 1( i)  0 8 i 2 ; 8 i (11)
2.3 Bayesian-Nash Implementation
For ease of notation we dene the interim probability of provision as perceived
by agent i as
i(i) 
Z
r(i; i)dF n 1( i) (12)
and the interim expected side payments from the user contract of agent i to
the mechanism designer as
Ui(i) 
Z
zUi(i; i)dF n 1( i) (13)
so that the agents expected utility from the user contract can be written as
UUi(i) = i(i)i   Ui(i) (14)
We now use the following well known result:
Lemma 1 A mechanism hr(); zU1(); :::zUn()i is interim incentive com-
patible (IIC), i¤
a) expected probability of provision i(i) is non-decreasing in i; and
b) interim utility levels satisfy
UUi(i) = UUi() +
Z i

i()d (15)
so that high valuation types will receive a higher expected utility level and
each agents expected side payments satisfy
Ui(i) = Ui() +
Z i

di() 8i: (16)
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Proof: Standard.
If expectations of all side payment functions from the user contract Ui(i)
satisfy the above and the expectations of the probability of provision i(i)
are non-decreasing in type we can then chose a set of side payment functions
zUi() such that
R
zUi(i; i)dF n 1( i) = Ui(i) 8 i: One obvious choice
for such a function is zUi() = Ui(i): This procedure yields a Bayesian
incentive compatible allocation. Note that the IIC constraint determines
each agents interim expected utility up to some constant of integration.
The IIR conditionZ
(r(i; i)i   zUi(i; i))dF n 1( i)  0 8 i (17)
can be rewritten using the IIC condition as
UUi(i) = i(i)i   Ui(i) =
Z i

i()d   Ui() + i()  0 8 i (18)
As
R i

i()d  0 8 i we have a necessary and su¢ cient condition for IIR
to hold given by
UUi() = i()   Ui()  0 (19)
Lemma 2 Given the user contract is IIC, then ex-ante side payments satisfyZ
zUi()dF
n() =  UUi() +
Z 
i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r()dF n() (20)
Proof: See online Appendix.
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3 The Mechanisms
We are now in a position to derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the
existence of an e¤ort allocation function and an overall development prob-
ability that satisfy the key constraints of the analysis. We rst weaken the
requirement of strict (or ex-post) feasibility to weak (or ex-ante) feasibility.
It is well known (e.g. Cramton, Gibbons, & Klemperer, 1987) that this allows
for a more elegant analysis and once a mechanism is derived that satises
the latter, a simple transformation of transfers allows for a satisfaction of the
former. An allocation is then weakly feasible if side payments satisfy
nX
i=1
Z
zi()dF
n() 
nX
i=1
Z
(zUi() zPi())dF n()  0 (21)
We thus have the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 For any probability of provision r() such that i(i) is non-
decreasing in i; there exist net side payments z() such that < r(); z() >
is interim incentive compatible, interim individual rational, and weakly fea-
sible i¤ Z  nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r() np()
!
dF n()  0 (22)
Proof: See online Appendix.
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3.1 The Program P
The mechanism designer has to solve the following program P for the weakly
feasible overall mechanism that implements the contracts under interim in-
dividual rationality and incentive compatibility and generates non-negative
expected social benet. Using Lemma 3 this program is
Maxr()
(Z  nX
i=1
ir()  kn(r())
!
dF n(); 0
)
(23)
s:t: i(i) non-decreasing in i and (24)
s:t:
Z  nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r()  kn(r())
!
dF n()  0 (25)
The ex-post e¢ cient (or rst best) provision rule given by the rst order
condition for (23) equates
@kn(r())
@r
= (1  r) 1n 1 =
nX
i=1
i (26)
The provision rule is thus
r() =

0 if
Pn
i=1 i  1
1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1 if Pni=1 i > 1 (27)
Note that this rsts best development probability is interior for nite
magnitudes. Using an indicator function we have
r() =
0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A1fPni=1 i>1g (28)
at rst best total costs
kn(r
()) = n
0@1  nX
i=1
i
! 1
1 n
1A1Pn
i=1 i>1
	
(29)
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A su¢ cient condition for constraint (24) is that the hazard rate condition
holds, i.e. that the virtual utility
i   1  F (i)
f(i)
is non-decreasing in i (30)
Looking at the objective function, note that the function is concave in r()
and hence rst-order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for the constraint
optimization. Given (30), Program P can be solved by pointwise maximiza-
tion and its solution satises the monotonicity constraint.
In the following Lemma we show that the constraints that the user and
the provider contract put on the socially optimal outcome of the public good
provision is non-trivial. Generically the implementable mechanism cannot
achieve the rst best outcome.
The second bestmaximization problem of program P can be rearranged
using a Lagrange multiplier approach as
Maxr();
(
(1 + )
 R
(
Pn
i=1 ir()  kn(r())) dF n()

  R Pni=1 1 F (i)f(i)  r() dF n(); 0
)
(31)
We can show that the optimal Lagrange multiplier  is bounded away from
zero and hence the constraint is non-trivial. The proof parallels Hellwigs,
2003, proof of Proposition 1 and is relegated to the online appendix.
Lemma 4 Dene the probability of provision as an indicator function
r () 
0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A18>>>>><>>>>>:
(1 + )24 (Pni=1 i) 1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1 
kn

r () = 1  (
Pn
i=1 i)
  n
n 1
 35 >

Pn
i=1
h
1 F (i)
f(i)
i


1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(32)
Then there exists a unique Lagrange multiplier  > 0 such that
G() 
Z  nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r () kn(r ())
!
dF n() = 0 (33)
given n > 1: Also r () is non-increasing and G() is non-decreasing in :
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Proof: See online Appendix.
Looking at program P dened by (31) we can show that the shadow cost
of the constraint, and therefore the value of n that satises the complemen-
tary slackness condition nG(n) = 0 increases in n. Given there are more
agents, the probability that any particular agents signal will be pivotal for
the provision of the public good becomes negligible. It follows that extracting
a given side payment under the user contract and still satisfying incentive
compatibility and individual rationality becomes increasingly di¢ cult and
hence the constraint bears more heavily on the maximization program the
more agents are involved. This intuition is formalized by showing that the
critical Lagrange multiplier is not uniformly bounded.
Lemma 5 The Lagrange multiplier of program P grows out of bounds as n
gets large for any r() 2 [0; 1).
Proof: See online Appendix.
4 Limit Results
Given the characteristics of Program P we have analysed above it is now
interesting to nd out how the number of agents a¤ects the possibility to
obtain a desirable outcome.3
Looking at the rst best provision rule we nd the following Lemma:
Lemma 6 The rst best provision rule r() converges to provision with
certainty in economy n as n gets large.
Proof: See online Appendix.
Also
3In order to take limits we dene an economy n as given by a vector of type distributions
n = (1; :::; n) 2 n and an economy n+ 1 as given by a vector n+1 = (1; :::; n+1) 2
n+1 where n+1 is a new i.i.d. draw from the distribution F (i) accordingly.
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Lemma 7 The total cost function kn(r()) in economy n is increasing in n;
continuous, and strictly concave. It approaches a limit as
lim
n!1
kn(r()) =   ln(1  r()) (34)
Proof: See Appendix.
We now proceed with the construction of approximately e¢ cient mech-
anisms. Assuming for the moment that the type function density f() is
degenerate and has point mass half at the extremes of the support   [; ]
and that the random variables are i.i.d.. We may then use an argument by
Al-Najjar & Smorodinsky, 2000 and show
Lemma 8 The LHS of each agents interim incentive compatibility con-
straint is bounded above by
1p
2
2p
(n  1)e
1
12n :
Proof: See online Appendix.
Intuitively, as n grows large and the discrete Binomial distribution ap-
proaches a continuous Normal distribution, the highest probability of having
a precise number of occurrences of i =  (i.e. of knowing to be the pivotal
agent) goes to zero as the Normal distribution has no atoms. For large n the
exponential term above converges to one so that we see that the incentive to
reveal ones type truthfully is approximately falling in (
p
n) 1:4
The perceived probability of being the pivotal agent can be interpreted
as the underlying motivation for making contributions towards the provision
of the public good in the user contract. We have shown that this motivation
is decreasing in n for each individual agent at the rate of (
p
n) 1 so that the
value of the virtual utility term by a theorem of Lindeberg-Levy satises
1p
n
nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

d! N(0; 2) (35)
4An extension to non-degenerate type space is in their Section.3.3.
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where we normalize  = 0.5 As the indicator constraint condition in Lemma
4 implies that for the expected aggregate side payments we integrate only over
positive sums, the expected value for large n can be derived as
R1
0
xd(x) 
' where() is the Normal distribution function. There thus exists a constant
' > 0 such that the stabilized sum has a limit
lim
n!1
1p
n
Z 0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A (36)
1nPn
i=1

i  1 F (i)f(i)

>0
o nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

dF n() = '
and so the sum of expected virtual utilities that can be collected from the
agents if strategic constraints are taken into account will grow out of bounds
in
p
n: 6 The Theorem now shows that even under the constraints imposed,
the probability of provision in a second best mechanism will converge in
probability to the rst best probability as n becomes large.
5As one referee has emphasized, such a normalization is typical but not completely
innocuous. It implies that there remains the possibility that an agent does not benet
from the provision of the public good at all. This may be empirically plausible for public
goods whose benet can occur privately (without the possibility of some subset of agents
being physically excluded) but for which agents are taxed (here with the opportunity
costs of their e¤ort) collectively. The notion of taxation in our context of public good
provision may only be disputable for our assumption of participation constraints inasmuch
as the designer can retain its coercive powers in a global and competitive environment.
As we are concerned with large number results below the normalization is necessary in
order to prevent the construction of simpler mechanisms that allow for concurrent welfare
results with may agents. Normalizing the lower support to some strictly negative constant
on the other hand will lead to asymptotic impossibility.
6Having exclusion as an additional instrument (as investigated in Hellwig, 2003 and
Norman, 2004) allows for a simple, ex-post IR, xed fee mechanism and a collection from
participating agents that grows out of bounds linearly.
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Theorem 9 Let


rnj ();p
n
j (); z
n
j ()
  	nj () be a jth-best allocation given
the direct provision technology and n agents. Then for a rst best allocation
	n1 () :r
n
1 ()
a:s:! 1 i.e. almost surely as n!1: For a second best allocation
	n2 () : r
n
2 ()
p! 1 i.e. in probability as n ! 1. The expected loss from
second best relative to rst best thus converges to zero.
Proof: See Appendix.
Despite convergence to the rst best provision rule the direct provision
technology implies that there is some waste of e¤ort due to our conservative
assumption that the designer requires direct provision from all agents. In
the limit this total waste is   ln(1  rn())  1 by Lemma 7 and generically
bounded whereas the gross benet from the mechanism is unbounded above.
5 Conclusion
The analysis has shown that irrespective of an increased incentive to free
ride on other agentse¤orts, the conditions for the provision of a public good
with a direct provision technology are relaxed as the number of agents gets
large. Substituting any ad hocchoice of the cost function for the provision
of the public good with an endogenous motivation we depart from existing
approaches by specifying a new provision technology benchmark. Despite our
conservative choice of an inherent duplication of e¤orts in the corresponding
Bayesian Mechanisms we are able to approximate the rst best outcome
arbitrarily closely in the limit. Our result thus sheds light on the conditions
for the provision of certain public goods that are commonplace in modern
information technologies which may be provided directly by its users when
there is a large number of them.
Clearly the mapping from any abstract direct mechanisms that enables
the analysis in the rst place into more practical mechanisms constitutes a
challenge. This is the case even more so when looking at the public good
nature of information within the context of modern information technologies,
where direct monetary payments do not seem constitute the rule.
An exception may be the case of academic research where dissipation
usually cannot be fully prevented. Given that progress in such research can
be fairly described by independent research e¤orts we have argued above that
15
signing a provider contract comes close to a base salary that is independent
of ones stake in a particular venture. Academic publishers on the other hand
will try to charge high valuation users di¤erently for the timely receipt of
the nal articles. Hence this may generate something akin to the revenue
collected in the user contract.
With many researchers then the next innovation module is almost certain
and despite everyone putting in e¤ort the costs imposed by the base salaries
will be bounded above as more agents and higher individual e¤orts can be
traded o¤. On the other hand the total benet from those willing to learn
about the development in print is unbounded above thus relaxing the overall
feasibility constraint of the mechanism. The analysis and its positive limit
result may therefore be interpreted as an argument for integrating academic
publishing closely with the large research community in order to make sure
that the proceeds of publishing activities can ow back to those who have
provided the e¤ort.
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6 Appendix I
Proof of Lemma 7:
The rst derivative of the total cost function w.r.t n is
@kn(r())
@n
= 1  (1  r()) 1n

1  ln (1  r())
n

 0 (37)
i.e. non-negative for all r() 2 [0; 1) which follows from noting that the LHS
is increasing in n so that we can focus on the case n = 1: Now the rst and
second bracket are always strictly smaller than one for r() 2 [0; 1) hence
the result follows. The second derivative is
@2kn(r())
@n2
=   (1  r()) 1n (ln (1  r()))
2
n3
< 0 (38)
hence the function is strictly concave in n:
In the limit, total costs will converge which follows from rewriting
(1  r()) 1n = exp(  1
n
ln(
1
1  r())) (39)
where the exponent will go to zero as n becomes large. We then use a Taylor
approximation around zero, which implies that from the expansion of the
exponential function into exp(x) =
P1
n=0
xn
n!
we use the rst two terms and
nd
(1  r()) 1n 

1  1
n
ln(
1
1  r())

(40)
and this will be a strict equality for n ! 1 as all remaining terms can be
neglected. We thus have that the limit of kn(r()) becomes
lim
n!1

n(1  (1  r()) 1n )

= ln(
1
1  r()) =   ln(1  r()): (41)
Note that total costs will only be uniformly bounded if r() < 1.
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Proof of Theorem 9:
For large n the sum of valuations will be unbounded above for almost all
type realizations whereas Lemma 7 reveals an upper bound on total costs
for all n so that from a rst best perspective the probability of provision
approaches certainty almost surely which can be seen from Lemma 6. In
order to show uniform convergence in provision probability for a second best
allocation we need to show that for any " > 0; there exists a number of agents
n(") so that for n  n(") we have
Pr fjrn()  1j > "g  " (42)
so that as n grows out of bounds r n() converges in probability to the rst
best provision probability.
The second best probability of provision as given by Program P is
rn() 
0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A18>>>>><>>>>>:
(1 + )24 (Pni=1 i) 1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1 
kn

rn() = 1  (
Pn
i=1 i)
  n
n 1
 35 >

Pn
i=1
h
1 F (i)
f(i)
i


1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(43)
As the Lagrange multiplier is unbounded above by Lemma 5 for large n we
can focus on
rn() =
0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A18><>: 1pnPni=1i  1 F (i)f(i) > 1pnkn
 
rn()=1 (
Pn
i=1
i)
  nn 1
!
1 (
Pn
i=1
i)
  nn 1
9>=>;
(44)
Using Lemma 8 in its modication for a continuous type space we know
that individual incentive constraints will be bounded above by some positive
constant that is decreasing in (
p
n) 1: Whence the term on the LHS of the
indicator condition will converge to some strictly positive constant. Using
Lemma 7 we know that
kn
0@rn() = 1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A (45)
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will be bounded above and the RHS of the indicator condition converges to
zero. Thus we nd that for any " > 0; there exists a number of agents n(")
so that for n  n(") we have convergence in probability, i.e.
Pr fjrn()  1j > "g = (46)
Pr
8>>>><>>>>:

1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1
18>><>>:
1p
n
kn

rn() = 1  (
Pn
i=1 i)
  n
n 1

<
1p
n
Pn
i=1

i   1 F (i)f(i)

1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1
9>>=>>;
< 1  "
9>>>>=>>>>;  ":
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8 Appendix II
Proof of Lemma 2:
Interim side payments have been found above as
Ui(i) =  UUi() + i(i)i 
Z i

i()d (47)
Now integrating over the full support we nd that from the independence
assumption Z
zUi()dF
n() =
Z
Ui(i)dF (i) (48)
so that Z
zUi()dF
n() = (49)Z 
 UUi() + i(i)i  
Z i

i()d

dF (i) =
 UUi() + i(i)i  
Z Z i

i()ddF (i)
Integration by parts of the last term and some rearranging yieldsZ
zUi()dF
n() =  UUi() +
Z 
i   1  F (i)
f(i)

i(i)dF (i) (50)
ThusZ
zUi()dF
n() =  UUi() +
Z 
i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r()dF n(): (51)
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Proof of Lemma 3:
Only-if-part: Suppose that hr(); zU1(); :::zUn()i is interim incentive
compatible and interim individually rational. Then summing (20) over all n
we have
nX
i=1
Z
zUi()dF
n() =  
nX
i=1
UUi() +
Z nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r()dF n()
(52)
Using the denition of weak feasibility this becomes
nX
i=1
Z
zPi()dF
n() +
nX
i=1
UUi() 
Z nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r()dF n()  0
(53)
Using the degree of freedom in the analysis which follows from the constant
of integration in Lemma 1 we normalize
UUi() = i()   Ui() = 0 (54)
so that the interim individual rationality constraint for the lowest type is
strictly binding: Finally using the implementation assumption of the provi-
sion contract (8) we nd the constraint asZ  nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r() np()
!
dF n()  0 (55)
If-part: is again well known. We now show that, as claimed in Section
3 above, if (22) is satised, then side payments can be chosen so that even
feasibility holds. The proof is by construction and follows the "If-part" of the
Proof of Lemma 4 in Cramton, et. al. (1987) (see also Börgers and Norman
(2008))7. Let the new side payments be
zUi() = Ui(i) + zPi() 
1
n  1
X
j 6=i
Uj(^j) + (56)
1
n  1
X
j 6=i
Z
Uj(^j)dF (^ j) 
1
n  1
X
j 6=i
Z
zPj()dF n 1(i; i)
7Börgers, T., & Norman, P. (2008): A note on budget balance under interim partici-
pation constraints: the case of independent types", Economic Theory.
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then summing over all n we nd
nX
i=1
zUi() =
nX
i=1
zPi()+
nXZ
Uj(^j)dF (^ j) 
nXZ
zPj()dF n 1(i; i)
(57)
and by weak feasibility the sum of the last two termis non-negative we thus
nd that also feasibility holds:
nX
i=1
zi()  0 (58)
Furthermore, taking expectations over all other types  i we nd thatZ
zUi()dF
n 1(i; i) = Ui(i) (59)
and so the new transfers also interim incentive compatible.
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Lemma 4: Dene the probability of provision as an indicator function
r () 
0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A18>>>>><>>>>>:
(1 + )24 (Pni=1 i) 1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1 
kn

r () = 1  (
Pn
i=1 i)
  n
n 1
 35 >

Pn
i=1
h
1 F (i)
f(i)
i


1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(60)
Then there exists a unique Lagrange multiplier  > 0 such that
G() 
Z  nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r () kn(r ())
!
dF n() = 0 (61)
given n > 1: Furthermore r () is non-increasing and G() is non-decreasing
in :
Proof:
Following arguments similar to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and
Hellwig, (2003), we show that ! G() is increasing and negative for  = 0
as show below that G(0) < 0 for n > 1 and G() is continuous.
As  gets large the indicator function above approaches one of the form
r ()  1 
 
nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
Pn
i=1

i  1 F (i)f(i)



1 (
Pn
i=1 i)
  nn 1

>kn(r ()=1 (
Pn
i=1 i)
  nn 1
(62)
so that there exists some ^ > 0 for which we have G(^) > 0 given kn(r () =
1   (Pni=1 i)  nn 1 ) = n1  (Pni=1 i) 11 n < n which holds for all n < 1:
Note that this indicator function r () is chosen such that for  = 0 we
get the rst best result as in that case (
Pn
i=1 i) 

1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 1  
kn

r () = 1  (
Pn
i=1 i)
  n
n 1

> 0 is indeed the unconstrained maximum
welfare.
Strict monotonicity of G() is shown by looking at r1() 6= r2() for
any 1 6= 2:W.l.o.g. let r1() = 1 (
Pn
i=1 i)
  n
n 1 ; then from the indicator
24
function this implies that for small  
nX
i=1
i
!

0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A  kn
0@r() = 1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A > 0
(63)
and for r2() = 0 < r1() and large  the condition
nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)


0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A kn
0@r() = 1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A  0
(64)
holds and thus r1() 7 r2() as 1 ? 2.
Furthermore by denition we have
G(1) G(2) =Z  
(r1()  r2())
Pn
i=1

i   1 F (i)f(i)

 
(kn(r1()) kn(r2()))
!
dF n() (65)
Using the monotonicity of kn(r()) in r() for n > 1 and (64) we nd the
nal result that G(1) 7 G(2) implies that 2 ? 1 has to hold.
Intermediate result for Lemma 4:
See that G(0) < 0 for n > 1:
Proof: Note that for n = 1 the problem of providing a public good or a
private good are isomorphic. Following Güth and Hellwig, (1986), Proposi-
tion 5.4.8 we assume n > 1 agents rewriting condition (33) using the ex-post
e¢ cient provision probability r() as given by the indicator function (28)
as
G(0) =
Z  nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

r() kn(r())
!
dF n()  0 (66)
Our aim is to show that this condition will not hold. We rewrite the
condition by integrating the ex-post e¢ ciency condition into the limits of
the integral as
8Güth, W. & Hellwig, M.F. (1986): The Private Supply of a Public Good, Journal
of Economics, Supplement, 5, p.121-159.
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Z

 
nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

  kn(r())
!
dF n()  0 (67)
where
 
(
 2 n

nX
i=1
i >
kn(r())
r()
)
(68)
We aim to show that this leads to a contradiction. In order to separate out
integrals, let k = 1:::n and dene two critical type vectors as
k 
(
k 2 k

kX
i=1
i >
kn(r())
r()

k 1X
i=1
i
)
(69)
and
k 1 
(
k 1 2 k 1

k 1X
i=1
i + 1 >
kn(r())
r()

k 1X
i=1
i
)
(70)
so that   [nk=1

k  [0; 1]n k as we only need to integrate over the types
for which the constraint holds. We can rewrite the constraint (25) using the
independence assumption as
nX
k=1
Z
k[0;1]n k
 
nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

  kn(r())
!
dF n()  0 (71)
For k > 1 we decompose the integral and write
Z
k 1
Z 1
kn(r()) 
Pk 1
i=1 i
 
kX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

  kn(r())
!
 (72)
dFk(k)dF
k 1(k 1) + F k(k)
nX
j=k+1
Z 
j   1  F (j)
f(j)

dFj(j)
For j = k+1:::n the expected value of the virtual utility is (= 0) and hence
the second term falls out.
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Integrating by parts we can show that the rst part becomesZ 1
kn(r()) 
Pk 1
i=1 i

u   1  F (u)
f(u)

dFu(u) = (73) 
kn(r()) 
k 1X
i=1
i
! 
1  Fk(kn(r()) 
k 1X
i=1
i)
!
As we have the rst-best choice in the integral condition we nd
G(0) =
Z
k[0;1]n k
 
nX
i=1

i   1  F (i)
f(i)

  kn(r())
!
dF n() =
Z
k 1
 
k 1X
i=1
 
i   1  F (i)
f(i)

  kn(r()) + kn(r()) 
k 1X
i=1
i
!!

 
1  Fk
 
kn(r()) 
k 1X
i=1
i
!!
dF k 1(k 1) =
 
Z
k 1
k 1X
i=1

1  F (i)
f(i)
 
1  Fk
 
kn(r()) 
k 1X
i=1
i
!!
dF k 1(k 1)  0
(74)
thus the rst best outcome violates the constraint. If n > 1 and (at least)
k > 1; k 1 has positive measure and thus the inequality is strict so that we
have G(0) < 0: One way of interpreting this result is that for a non-trivial
number of agents a mechanism that imposes the rst best outcome would
imply a loss to the designer and hence the public good can only be provided
with a subsidy.
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Proof of Lemma 5:
By contradiction: The program P can be written as
Maxr();
(Z  nX
i=1

i   
1 + 

1  F (i)
f(i)

r()  kn(r())
!
dF n(); 0
)
Denote r n() as the provision rule that maximizes the probability of pro-
vision and we assume that  =  is constant, so that r n() = r (): For a
constant multiplier , r ()
a:s:! 1 if
lim
n!1
0@ kn(r())Pn
i=1

i   1+

1 F (i)
f(i)

1A a:s:! 0 (75)
for all r() 2 [0; 1): Looking at
(1  (1  r ())
1
n ) =
1
n
nX
i=1

i  

1 + 

1  F (i)
f(i)

(76)
we solve into
1  r () =
 
1  1
n
nX
i=1

i  

1 + 

1  F (i)
f(i)
!n
(77)
Using the LLN in the numerator we know that the realization of the sum of
random variables converges to its expectation almost surely, i.e.
lim
n!1
 
1
n
nX
i=1

i  

1 + 

1  F (i)
f(i)
!
=
E fg
1 + 
< 1 (78)
i.e. a constant, which follows from an integration by parts. Hence for large n
the equality can only be satised if we have that r ()
a:s:! 1, given a constant
multiplier. This contradicts the assumption, as almost sure convergence im-
plies that for large n, the provision probability r(~i;
n 1
 i ) cannot vary very
much with the signal of the ith agent and hence the side payment extracted
from him under the user contract will be close to zero. As this holds for
any agent the feasibility constraint will be violated. Thus the Lagrange mul-
tiplier cannot be constant and therefore n has to grow out of bounds as
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the number of agents gets large. We conclude that limn!1 
n = 1 has
to hold so that both numerator and denominator go to zero which prevents
r ()
a:s:! 1:
Proof of Lemma 6:
The rst best provision rule satises
lim
n!1
r() = lim
n!1
0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A1fPni=1 i>1g = 1: (79)
Proof of Lemma 8:
The interim incentive compatibility of a mechanism (satisfying the two
contracts) guarantees that no agent has an incentive to misrepresent valua-
tions, i.e. Z
(r(i; i)i   p(i; i))dF n 1( i) Z
(r(^i; i)i   p(^i; i))dF n 1( i) 8 i; ^i 2 ; 8 i (80)
Consider only mechanisms which treat all agents symmetrically and let
r() 2
n
0;

1  (Pni=1 i)  nn 11fPni=1 i>1go be non-decreasing in
k  #i i = 	. The strictest interim incentive compatibility condition
is given as
Z
(r(i = ; i)  r(i = ; i))dF n 1( i) 
1
n
Z
(kn(r(i = ; i))  kn(r(i = ; i)))dF n 1( i) (81)
Due to symmetry we can write r as a function of k and there is at most one
value of k (dening the pivotalagent k) for which
(r(k = ; k)  r(k = ; k)) =
0@1  nX
i=1
i
!  n
n 1
1A1fPni=1 i>1g
(82)
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Let h be the number of agents besides i to have i =  we can rewrite the
incentive compatibility using the Binomial distribution for equal probability
as
max
h
"
1
2
n 1
(n  1)!
(n  1  h)!h!
#

1
n
Z
(kn(r(i = 1; i))  kn(r(i = 0; i)))dF n 1( i) (83)
where the LHS is now the probability of being the pivotal agent k. An
upper bound on the LHS is found by choosing h = (n   1)=2 (as in the
simple majority rule case) so that using Stirlings formula given as
n! =
p
2n
n
e
n
e
%(n)
12n for some %(n) 2 (0; 1) (84)
we have 
1
2
n 1 p2(n  1)  n 1
e

n 1e
%(n)
12nq
2(n 1
2
)
 
n 1
2e
n 1
2 e
%(n)
12n
2  (85)

1
2
n 1 p(n  1)  n 1
e

n 1e
1
12n
p
2
q
(n 1
2
)
 
n 1
2e
n 1
2
2 =
1p
2
2p
(n  1)e
1
12n :
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